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Graham clearly demonstrates the powerful role which Teague
continues to play in the appellate process for capital cases. The Court
generally has taken a narrow view of what reasonable jurists at the time
of a defendant's trial would have held, 23 and therefore innovative
theories of law put forth on collateral review will rarely succeed.
There is little defense counsel can do at this point to combat the
harshness of Teague other than to try and place a claim within the
realm of prior precedent. So long as the Teague new rule doctrine is
in force defendants will be trapped in time, with only the remedies
available to them when their sentences became final to rely upon
during their appeals.
The other notable aspect of this case is Justice Thomas' concur24
rence. Echoing Justice Scalia's sentiments in Walton v. Arizona,
Justice Thomas used his concurrence to argue that the Lockett-Eddings
line of mitigation cases represent a regression towards the days of less
rational sentencing schemes. Justice Thomas examined at great length
the history of racially discriminatory practices in the use of the death

penalty, and argued that justice and fairness require less and not more
discretion on the part ofjuries in capital cases. Too much discretion,
he suggested, would allow racism to infiltrate the sentencer's decision.
Justice Thomas focused much of his attack on Penry itself,
arguing that the type of leniency which that case allows opens the door
to discriminatory practices: "We have consistently recognized that the
discretion to accord mercy - even if 'largely motivated by the desire
to mitigate' - is indistinguishable from the discretion to impose the
death penalty." 25 Justice Thomas sought to uphold rational responses
over moral ones, and therefore advocated giving Eddings a narrow
reading through which it would act more as a rule of evidence than a
rule of substantive law.26 In the end Justice Thomas viewed the Penry
decision as too big a step away from rationality and argued that it
should be overturned.

23 But see Stringerv. Black, 112 S.Ct. 1130 (1992) (holding that
Clemons v. Mississippiwas not a "new rule" for Teague purposes). In
Stringer,the Court looked beyond the Teague threshold issue in order to
effectuate the requirement that the aggravating factors be stated with
specificity. See case summary of Stringer,Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
5, No. 1, p. 11, nn. 84-92 and accompanying text (1992).

24 497 U.S. 639, 661 (1990)(Scalia, J., dissenting). See case
summary of Walton, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 5 (1990).
25 Graham, 113 S.Ct. at 913 (quoting Furman,408 U.S. at 313-14
(White, J.,
concurring)).
26 Graham, 113 S.Ct. at 910.

Summary and Analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady

RICHMOND v. LEWIS
113 S.Ct. 528 (1992)
United States Supreme Court

On August 25, 1973, Bernard Crummet met Rebecca Corella in
an Arizona bar where she agreed to perform an act of prostitution with
Crummet. The two left the bar and met the petitioner, Willie Lee
Richmond, and his girlfriend in the parking lot. Petitioner, Richmond
drove the group to Corella's hotel where he indicated to the group that
he intended to rob Crummet.
After the encounter between Crummet and Corella concluded,
the group again went for a drive. Once outside Tucson, Richmond
stopped the car, got out and struck Crummet to the ground. He then
threw several large rocks at the deceased, and either Richmond or
Corella or both of them proceeded to rob Crummet. Finally, either the
petitioner or Corella, whoever was driving, drove the car over Crummet
twice and caused his death.
Richmond was convicted of both robbery and first degree murder,
with the murder conviction being returned by a general verdict. The
trial judge then held the required penalty hearing and found that two
statutory aggravating factors existed: that petitioner had a prior felony

conviction involving the use or threat of violence on another person
and that the petitioner had committed the offense in an especially cruel
or depraved manner. The judge sentenced Richmond to death.
Although Richmond unsuccessfully sought state postconviction
relief of his specific sentence, 1 the Supreme Court of Arizona eventually held the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional because it
limited defendants to statutory mitigating factors. 2 Consequently, the
Arizona court vacated every pending death sentence, including
3
Richmond's.
At Richmond's resentencing hearing, petitioner's witnesses testified to the fact that Richmond was not the driver of the car and
presented evidence of petitioner's rehabilitation in prison. However,
the judge sentenced Richmond to death, this time finding three
statutory aggravating factors: a prior violent felony, the offense was
especially heinous, cruel or depraved, and a prior felony meriting life
imprisonment. 4 Once again, the judge did not specifically find that
Richmond had been the driver of the car. In addition, the judge found
no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency.

1 State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186,560 P.2d 41 (1976). In applying
for state postconviction relief, Richmond attached two affidavits by
persons who stated that Corella had claimed that she, not the petitioner,
had driven the car over the victim. The Supreme Court of Arizona
affirmed the conviction and sentence. In affirming the sentence, the court
did not reach defendant's vagueness challenge to the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" factor because it found that his death sentence
was supported by another valid statutory aggravating factor and that no

mitigating factors applied.
Soon after denial of state relief, federal habeas proceedings took
place and the petitioner's conviction was affirmed but the sentence was
found invalid. See State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 444-44.5, 586 P.2d
1253, 1256-57 (1978).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-703(F).

FACTS
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A divided Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Richmond's death
sentence, with each of the five justices joining one of three opinions. 5
Two justices joined in the principal opinion, two justices concurred in
the result and one justice dissented. The two concurring justices
concluded that petitioner committed neither "gratuitous violence" nor
"needless mutilation" within the meaning of the Arizona death penalty
statute. However, these two justices agreed that the death sentence
6
was appropriate, regardless of the absence of the above factor.
Upon considering Richmond's habeas corpus action, the Ninth
Circuit denied relief and held that the "elimination of the the challenged factor would still leave enough support for [petitioner's]
'7
sentence because the statute at issue here is not a 'weighing' statute."
Richmond then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, challenging his death sentence atthe resentencing
on the grounds that the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved"
aggravating factor, upon which the sentencing judge relied, was
unconstitutionally vague, and that the Supreme Court of Arizona
failed to cure this constitutional invalidity in Richmond H. Specifically, he argued that the Arizona Supreme Court did not specifically
reweigh the remaining valid aggravating factors to determine if the
death penalty was appropriate.

The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating clearly that
where an invalid aggravating factor is relied upon by the sentencer, the
state court must reweigh at the resentencing hearing. 9 The Court
wrote that while case law does not set forth the degree of clarity with

which a state must reweigh in order to cure an otherwise invalid death
sentence, at a minimum the Court must be able to ascertain with
certainty that the reweighing actually took place. 10 The Court held
that where "the death sentence has been infected by a vague or
otherwise constitutionally invalid aggravating factor, the state appellate court or some other state sentencer must actually perform a new
sentencing calculus, if the sentence is to stand." ' I IThe Supreme Court,
with forceful language, emphasized that "[o]nly constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing at the trial or appellate level suffices
12
to guarantee that the defendant received an individualized sentence."
Because in Richmond the concurring justices did not even purport to
perform such a reweighing or mention the evidence in mitigation,
13
reversal was required.
Richmond strongly emphasizes the importance the Supreme Court
places on the constitutional mandate of individualized consideration. 14 Moreover, the Court explicitly stated that death sentences will
not be upheld and due process will not be satisfied unless it can be
clearly seen in the reviewing state court opinion that the defendant was
given express individualized consideration. The Court found that
there could be no presumption of reweighing in this case, as the
15
opinion appeared to automatically affirm the death sentence.
Richmond reinforces the seriousness of the holdings set forth in
Stringerv. Black, 16 Sochor v. Florida,17 and Espinosa v.Florida.18
This trilogy of cases used strong language to emphasize the need for
"reweighing" or harmless error analysis when an aggravating factor is
found invalid. For example, Stringerheld that when an aggravating
factor is held unconstitutional, the court must determine "that the
invalid factor would not have made a difference to the jury's determination." 1 9 The Court also concluded that the reviewing court "may not
make the automatic assumption that [an invalid aggravating factor]
has not infected the weighing process."' 20 Similarily, in Richmond the
Court clearly stated that individualized consideration must be accorded and that it will not read into the opinion that this has been done.
The weighing and scrutinizing process must be explicitly evidenced.
In Sochor, the Court held that state appellate courts must "explain" the basis for upholding a sentence. 2 1 In Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, she stated that the "justifiably high standard.., can be

5 State v.Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 666 P.2d 57 (1983) (Richmond
1,).
6 Id. (concurring opinion of J. Cameron and J. Gordon).
7 Richmond v. Ricketts, 921 F.2d 933, 947 (1990). The Ninth
Circuit later amended the opinion to omit that sentence, but the amended
opinion still reasoned that "under the statute at issue in Clemons, the
invalidation of an aggravating circumstance necessarily renders any
evidence of mitigation 'weightier' or more substantial in arelative sense;
the same, however, cannot be said under the terms of the Arizona statute
at issue here." 948 F.2d 1473, 1488-1489 (1992).
8 Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S.Ct. 528, 537 (1992).
9 The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
Arizona is not a "weighing" state. The Court's conclusion was based
partly on the Arizona statute itself and partly on Arizona caselaw
which purportedly held that Arizona was a "weighing" state. The
Arizona statute, however, requires only that at least one aggravating
factor must be present and that no mitigating factors are "sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(E)
(1989). This language seems to indicate that Arizona does not formally
"weigh" aggravating factors against mitigating factors. Additionally,
the only recent Arizona case cited by the Supreme Court which was State
v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783, 801 (Ariz.), cert.denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992),
which hardly indicated Arizona's status on this issue with any clarity.
Brewer stated only that all mitigating evidence must be considered and
that"it is within the discretion of the trialjudge how much weight should
be given to the proffered mitigating evidence." Id.

It is unclear whether Virginia is a "weighing" or "non-weighing"
state. However, much like the Ninth Circuit's ruling with respect to
Arizona law in Richmond, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
concluded that Virginia is not a "weighing" state. See Jones v. Murray,
976 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1992), and case summary of Jones, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue. DespiteJones,attorneys should note that the
Richmond Court held that specificity rules for aggr
,gfactors
applied to Arizona, a state which arguably was not a "weighing" state.
10 Id. at 535.
11 Id. (emphasis added).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 In Gregg v. Georgia,428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976), the court held
that states that allow capital punishment must establish a "meaningful
method for differentiating between the few cases where [the death
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not."
1 Richmond, 113 S.Ct. at 535.
16 112 S.Ct. 1130 (1992). See case summary of Stringer,Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992).
17 112 S.Ct. 2114 (1992). See case summary of Sochor, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992).
18 112 S.Ct. 2926 (1992). See case summary of Espinosa,Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992).
19 Stringer, 112 S.Ct. at 1137.
20 Id.
21 112 S.Ct. at 2123.

HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
decision. While the Court did not find that the Arizona statute was
facially unconstitutionally vague, they did agree with the petitioner
that the concurrence in Richmond I did not properly reweigh the
remaining aggravating factors, as required by the Eighth Amendment. 8
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
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met without uttering the magic words 'harmless error,'. . .[but] the
reverse is not true." 22 In other words, the Supreme Court requires a
"'principled explanation' of how the [state] court reached [its] conclusion."'23 This high level of scrutiny set forth by Justice O'Connor is
reinforced in her majority opinion in Richmond.
With the aid of Stringer,Sochor, Espinosa and now Richmond,
Virginia attorneys should be better equipped to battle the indifference
of the Virginia Supreme Court on the issue of specificity in aggravating factor instructions. The cases provide clear authority for the

22 Id. at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

requirement that at some point in the Virginia sentencing scheme, an
express and specific use of properly named aggravating factors must
be made evident. Defense attorneys should be prepared to argue the
importance of these cases and how the Eighth Amendment requires a
level of individualized consideration that Virginia does not currently
provide.
Summary and analysis by:
Lesley Meredith James

23 Id.

DOBBS v. ZANT
113 S. Ct. 835 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Wilbum Dobbs was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to
death by a Georgia jury. In his first federal habeas petition, Dobbs
argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at his
sentencing hearing, particularly citing the closing argument made by
his court-appointed attorney. At an evidentiary hearing held on the
matter, the State was unable to produce a transcript of counsel's
closing argument, so the court relied on the testimony of the attorney
himself as to the content of his closing arguments. The district court
found Dobbs had received effective assistance. 1 The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying once again on counsel's
testimony at the evidentiary hearing regarding his closing argument in
2
mitigation.
Subsequently, the State located a transcript of the closing argu3
ment, which varied in some degree from counsel's recollection.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals denied the petitioner's motion to
supplement the record with the sentencing transcript. In affirming that
denial, the Eleventh Circuit found that the "law of the case" doctrine
prevented it from reconsidering its prior rejection of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.4 Although the court acknowledged the
manifest injustice exception to the law of the case doctrine,5 the court
refused to apply the exception, reasoning in Catch-22 fashion that
without the transcript, petitioner would be unable to show an injustice. 6
Petitioner Dobbs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.

1 Civ. Action No. 80-247 (ND Ga., Jan. 13, 1984), p. 24.
2 Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1514, and n. 15 (1986).
3 The majority wrote that the newly found transcript "flatly contradicted the account given by counsel in key respects." Dobbs v. Zant, 113
S. Ct. at 835 (1993). However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
objected to this characterization of the transcript. At the evidentiary
hearing, defense counsel thought he had raised two issues in his closing
argument: the death penalty is improper in any case, and the killing was
impulsive. Counsel testified that he was "'sure' he had argued the
impulsive-killing point," that he "assume[d] [he] argued it," and that "a
lot of this is really not from actual recollection." Tr. 70-71 (Nov. 10,
1982). The transcript revealed that counsel made only the impropriety of
the death penalty argument.
4 Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1409 (1991).
5 Under the policy of "law of the case," an appellate court's
determination of a legal question (here petitioner's ineffective assistance

HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari
and reversed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit. 7 Citing Gardnerv.
Florida8 and Gregg v. Georgia,9 the Court emphasized the importance
of reviewing capital sentences on a complete record. 10 The Court went
on to consider the transcript's key relevance here (i.e., the factual
predicate for deciding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim) and
found that a complete record would have allowed the appeals court to
waive the law of the case doctrine by applying the manifest injustice
exception.11 Further, the Court held that the exclusion of the transcript
was not justified by the delay between the original determination of
effective assistance and the discovery of the transcript, because the
delay resulted from the State's erroneous representations and not the
petitioner's actions. 12 Finally, although the Court speculated that an
inadequate or harmful closing argument, coupled with a failure to
present mitigating evidence, could produce harmful results, the Court
followed its normal practice of letting the courts more familiar with a
case conduct the harmless error analysis.1 3 Therefore, the case was
14
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

of counsel claim) will generally be found binding on both trial courts on
remand and appellate courts on subsequent appeals. Since it is policy and
not law, it is general practice to disregard law of the case when to hold
otherwise would work manifest injustice.
6 Dobbs, 963 F.2d at 1409.
7
Dobbs v. Zant, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993).
8 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977) (emphasizing the importance of a
complete record in reviewing capital sentences).
9428 U.S. 153 (1976) (finding that the provision requiring transmittal of a complete transcript and record on appeal provides an important
"safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice").
0
Dobbs, 113 S. Ct. at 836.
11
12 Id.
Id.
13 Id., at 836, n. 1.
14 Id. at 836.

